Abstract
Introduction
Pricing for bandwidth has become an important topic in telecommunication networks, mainly for two reasons. First, demand for bandwidth keeps increasing, creating congestion that degrades the quality of service [3] . Second, telecommunication networks have to supply different kinds of services, with different quality of service (QoS) requirements. Pricing would permit to limit the congestion problem and to provide incentives so that all users will not choose the best QoS. For surveys on pricing schemes in relecommunication networks, the reader can see for instance [l, 4, 161 and the references therein.
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One of the main streams of pricing schemes is auctioning. In [6] , McKie-Mason and Varian suggest the use of a smart market where a bid is associated to each packet and those with the highest bid are given the highest priority. The price is computed based on the Vickrey-auction principle, as the bid of the lowest priority packet admitted. In [S, 131, the costly per packet auctions are replaced by auctions for bandwidth during intervals of time, called Progressive Second Price Auctions (PSP). Elastic users sequentially submit bids composed of the amount of bandwidth they require and the unit price they propose. Their bid depends on the bids already in competition for the resource. The bids with the highest unit price are allocated the bandwidth they ask and the total charge imposed to a user is computed-as the accumulated bid prices of those excluded by her presence. TO make sure that the resource is not sold at a too low level, a reserve price has been introduced, corresponding to a min; imum unit price. It is then shown that, under some assumptions, the game converges to an equilibrium that is efficient in terms of social welfare. This work has been extended in [14] to the analysis of a whole*network, and similar convergence and optimality properties have been shown. Other extensions and further analysis of the PSP can be found in [2, 8, 9, 10, 151. Whereas PSP analysis has been extensive, there remains the question about how to fix the reserve price, the last degree of freedom of the model. We investigate this issue in this paper, in order to maximize the expected network revenue. Based on the result of [7] that shows that, in steadystate and if demand exceeds capacity, the network revenue is close to the reserve price multiplied by the total capacity of the resource, we propose to determine the optimal reserve price when the number of players is apriori unknown, but its distribution is known.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic results on the PSP. Section 3 looks at the reserve price in terms of the market clearing price and presents how it can be chosen so that the revenue is maximized. Section 4 illustrates the results that can be obtained and conclusions are presented Section 5.
and

Progressive Second Price Mechanism
We summarize here the main results of [ 5 ] . Consider a single resource, with capacity Q. Assume that I players compete for it in an auction process, where the players bid sequentially. Player i's bid is si = (qi,pi) where qi is the capacity player i is asking and pi is the unit price she is proposing. Let s = (SI,. . . , SI) be the bid profile and s-i = (SI,. . . , si-1, si+l, .. . , s~) be the profile where player i's bid is excluded. We will sometimes write The progressive second price allocation rule [5, 13] gives to player i a bandwidth ai(.) = min(qi,Qi(pi; s-i)), (1) so that the highest bids are allocated the desired quantity, and the total cost ci that player i must pay is given by the declared willingness to pay (bids) of the users who are excluded by i's presence, i.e.,
It is assumed that a fee E is charged each time a player submits a bid and that player i has a budget constraint bi which imposes her that ci(si, s -i ) 5 bi. Let & ( s -i ) be the set of player i's bids verifying this constraint.
Assume that player i attempts to maximize a quasi- Convergence. If all the players bid like described above, the game converges to a P~-Nash equilibrium, where an E-Nash equilibrium is a bid profile s such that
Optimality. For the previous P~-Nash equilibrium, the resulting overall utility CiczuIo) &(ai) is maximized.
Reserve price and optimization problem
Reserve price and market clearing price
In [7] , we studied the equilibria that can be reached by the PSP mechanism without budget constraints when demand exceeds supply, that is when
where po is the reserve price fixed by the resource seller, and di is player i's demandfunction, i.e.
di(~)
We proved in [7] that under condition (3), the seller can ensure a revenue close to p0Q as the bid fee E tends to 0'.
If (3) is not verified, then all users i E Z will ask for the quantity di(p0) of resource they wish to get when the unit selling price is PO. As a result, the total quantity of resource that will be sold is d ( p 0 ) = ciEz &(PO), bringing the seller the revenue pod(p0).
, we establish that this value is the minimum revenue that the network can expect. However, depending on the valuation functions of users and on the order of bids among them, the revenue may be higher (see [9] ). Since the seller cannot control these parameters, we assume that she will try to maximize this minimum value.
Reserve price and revenue
In consequence, the Progressive Second Price mechanism applied with a small bid fee E ensures the seller to receive a revenue close to
Remark: We are faced here with the same trade-off as for a single-item auction (see [l I]): increasing the reserve price may increase the selling price, but may also reduce the probability of all the resource being sold.
Remark: If the seller chooses to sell the resource at a fixed unit price po without using the PSP mechanism, then her revenue will also be po x min (Q, d(p0) ). However, when demand exceeds supply, each user will want to buy a quantity di(p0) of resource until all the capacity is allocated, and therefore the allocation will not be efficient in the sense of social welfare.
The value R(p0,Z) depends on the set of players Z through the relation d(p0) = C i c z d i ( p o ) .
But this set is a priori unknown.
Assume that there are T different types of users (which might correspond to T different types of applications). Assume that we know ,from observations the joint distribution P, of the number of players competing for bandwidth, with P,((nl, ..., n~) ) being the probability that there are nt players of type t ( 1 5 t 
T ) . Let d ( t ) ( p ) correspond
to the demand function of a type-t user and be her valuation function. The expected network revenue can then be expressed using the joint law P, by We now assume that the seller will fix her reserve price po so as to maximize this expected revenue.
Optimization of the expected revenue
In this section, we study the concavity properties of the expected revenue ER(.) under a concavity assumption on the demand functions d!tl, 1 _< t 5 T. These properties imply that the determination of the reserve price that maximizes the expected revenue can easily be obtained.
Assumption 1 For all t , 1 5 t 5 T, the demand function
For example, quadratic valuation functions of the form2 
where the second line comes from the concavity of the func- 
Numerical illustration
As an illustration of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, consider the case where T = 3, and where the random variables representing the number of players n1,n2,n3 of each type follow independent Poisson distributions, each with mean 4.
The demand functions (and the corresponding marginal valuation functions) are supposed to be d(l)(P) = [5 -P P I + @ e;,)( [5, 7] and [7, lo] 
is concave on each [Ott+,)(0),8' (O)], so that there is a unique maximum, which can east; be determined by standard numerical optimization tools [12] . Using Corollary 2, by comparing the value over each interval, the global optimum can be obtained. On our example, the reserve price providing the best revenue is obtained on [5, 7] at po = 5.5, giving an average revenue of 67.9.
Conclusions
Progressive Second Price Auctions are an efficient way to allocate bandwidth among users. In this auction model, there remained a last degree of freedom, the reserve price that is the smallest unit price at which the seller accepts to allocate bandwidth. Based on a model where the actual number of users is unknown (but its distribution is known), we have provided a method so that the reserve price maximizing the average seller's revenue is easily obtained.
